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A FRAMEWORK FOR UNTANGLING INTENTS IN POSTHUMOUS SPERM 
EXTRACTION 
© 2012 Lark Zink 
I. Introduction 
Posthumous reproduction involves the conception and birth of a child by the 
means of artificial reproductive technology, after the death of either parent. Through 
technological innovation, death is no longer a bar to the creation of new life. By means of 
technologies that separate reproduction from the coital act, a widow may assert a claim to 
the sperm of her deceased husband in order to bear his genetically-related child.1 A 
woman may petition the probate court to enforce the will of her late boyfriend, entitling 
her to dispositional control over his cryogenically preserved sperm.2 A mother may carry 
on the memory of her murdered son by creating her biological grandchild through the use 
of posthumously extracted sperm and a gestational surrogate.3        
While medical practice and technological advances have yielded a wide range of 
reproductive possibilities, the law has lagged behind in its recognition and legal 
characterization of such acts. In this new legal forefront, courts have generally responded 
to the prospect of posthumous reproduction in one of two ways: 1) by effectuating the 
intent of the donor, or 2) employing a constitutional balancing of rights test.   
                                                
 
1 In re Estate of Kievernagel, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 311, 312 (Ct. App. 2008). 
2 Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 279 (Ct. App. 1993). 
3 Susan James, Sperm Retrieval: Mother Creates Life after Death, ABC NEWS, (Feb. 23, 2010), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/Wellness/mother-murdered-son-hopes-create-grandchild-post-
mortem/story?id=9913939#.TvFUF1auFpk. 
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This paper will trace the development of these two tests. The donor intent test 
requires identifying, and giving effect to, a legally sufficient statement of the decedent’s 
intent to reproduce posthumously. Litigated disputes in this area frequently concern the 
sufficiency of proof in support of decedent’s asserted intent to reproduce posthumously. 
By contrast, the constitutional balancing test weighs the rights of the decedent to 
posthumously dictate the use of his gametic material against the procreational rights of 
the surviving claimant. In addition to questions of proof, this test implicates constitutional 
considerations and public policy as relevant factors for the court to consider.   
Cases to date arise in the context of lifetime extraction, followed by a posthumous 
request to obtain and use the sperm for reproductive purposes. This paper will borrow by 
analogy from the case law covering lifetime extraction to argue in the context of 
posthumous extraction and reproduction, that the appropriate approach blends the donor 
intent and constitutional balancing tests.  This blended approach will effectuate the 
donor's intent as far as possible, while at the same time recognize the constitutional rights 
of the surviving claimant. 
II. The Donor’s Intent Test 
A. Genesis of the Test 
In a case of global first impression,4 the French court in Parpalaix c. CECOS5 was 
called upon to determine the legal status of sperm that had been voluntarily extracted 
prior to the decedent’s death, and remained in cryogenic storage at a state operated sperm 
                                                
 
4 Janet J. Berry, Essay, Life After Death: Preservation of the Immortal Seed, 72 TUL. L. REV. 231, 235 
(1997) (citations omitted).   
5 This case is unreported, but is discussed at length in E. Donald Shapiro & Benedene Sonnenblick, The 
Widow and the Sperm: The Law of Post-Mortem Insemination, 1 J.L. & HEALTH 229-33 (1985-87).  
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bank. In 1981, Alain Parpalaix was undergoing chemotherapy for testicular cancer.6 
Alain’s doctor advised him that the treatment would make him sterile.7 Armed with this 
grim prognosis, Alain made a “deposit” of sperm at the Centre D’Etude et de 
Conservation du Sperme (CECOS).8 Alain left no instructions for the fate of the sperm in 
the event of his death.9 The sperm was cryogenically frozen in liquid nitrogen, where it 
remained for over two years.10     
At the time of his deposit, Alain was living with his girlfriend, Corinne.11 Two 
days before his death, Alain and Corinne were wed in a hospital ceremony.12 Corinne 
subsequently requested the release of Alain’s stored sperm,13 which she planned to use 
for conception through artificial insemination.14 CECOS refused, asserting that its 
procedures did not allow for the return,15 and that CECOS was not legally required to 
release the sperm to Corinne.16 In response, Corinne and her in-laws sought review 
before the Tribunal de grand instance, on a claim sounding in contract.17      
Corinne asserted that the sperm was property, and therefore inheritable.18 She 
relied on the French Civil Code, which provided that in the event of death, goods 
deposited by a bailor would be returned to the bailor’s heirs.19 In addition, Corinne and 
Alain’s parents testified that Alain intended for Corinne to use his sperm to reproduce 
                                                
 
6 Id. at 229.  
7 Id.   
8 Id. 
9 See id. at 229-30. 
10 Id. at 230.   
11 Id.  
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 See id. at 229-33. 
15 Id. at 230. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 230-31. 
18 Id. at 230. 
19 Id. 
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posthumously, even though he did not leave written instructions to that effect.20 CECOS 
responded inter alia that its sole legal obligation was to the donor and contended that the 
sperm was not inheritable property.21 Instead, the sperm was an indivisible part of the 
body itself.22   
In its ruling, the court instead likened the sperm to “the seed of life,” holding that 
it was tied to the fundamental right of humans to conceive or abstain from conception.23 
This fundamental right was not subject to contract provisions.24 In order to safeguard the 
right, the fate of the sperm would be determined exclusively by the intent of the donor.25 
The court then established a two-part inquiry to determine a donor’s intent. To hold in 
favor of Corinne, the court would have to find: (1) that Alain intended for Corinne to use 
his sperm to undergo posthumous artificial insemination, and (2) that his intent was 
“unequivocable.”26  
In its decision, the court found sufficient confirmation of Alain’s reproductive 
intent in extrinsic evidence, and did not require a written declaration of intent.27 It was 
instead persuaded by the testimony of Alain’s next-of-kin that Alain wanted Corinne to 
reproduce with his sperm to mother a common child.28 Similarly, the court noted that the  
timing of the wedding, just two days before Alain’s imminent and expected death, was 
intended to facilitate and further Corinne’s claim to the sperm.29 On the basis of this 
                                                
 
20 Id. at 230-31. 
21 Id. at 231. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 232.   
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 See id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
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testimonial and circumstantial evidence, the court was satisfied that Alain's posthumous 
dispositional intent with respect to his sperm, although unwritten, had been adequately 
established. Thus, the court held that Corinne was entitled to Alain’s sperm stored with 
CECOS.30     
Although the court’s conclusion was based upon a finding that Alain’s intent to 
reproduce posthumously was adequately established by extrinsic proof, it should be noted 
that the overriding concern of the court was to protect the fundamental right of choice in 
matters of procreation.  To this end, the court refused to adopt the extreme classification 
positions advanced by either side: that the sperm be treated as property, as advocated by 
Corinne, or as an indivisible body part, as advanced by CECOS. Instead, the court 
adopted a middle-ground fundamental reproductive rights approach. By rejecting 
Corinne’s designation of the sperm as property, the court declined Corinne's invitation to 
apply the principles of property law in resolving the case. Since the sperm was not held to 
be property, by extension it could not be inherited;31 the sperm, therefore, could not be 
the subject of a bailment contract between the donor and the sperm bank.32 On the other 
hand, by refusing to categorize the sperm as an indivisible body part, the court avoided 
holding that the decedent’s wishes would die with him, and be given no posthumous 
effect. By instead classifying the sperm as the physical embodiment of a fundamental 
reproductive right of choice, the court was able to achieve the desirable outcome of 
honoring Alain’s intent and effectuating his wishes even after the termination of his legal 
personality by death. More importantly, the court was able to do so without implicating 
                                                
 
30 Id. at 233. 
31 See id. at 232. 
32 See id. 
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the negative consequences that a wholesale application of property law to sperm would 
engender.33                      
B. Transatlantic Adoption of the Donor Intent Test   
1. Hecht v. Superior Court 
 In the United States, Hecht v. Superior Court34 is the seminal case to adopt the 
intent approach in determining the posthumous disposition of sperm. In Hecht, the 
decedent, William Kane, anticipated taking his own life.35 Accordingly, he deposited 15 
vials of sperm with California Cryobank, Inc., and signed a storage agreement 
authorizing release of the sperm to his girlfriend, Deborah Hecht, or to Hecht’s physician, 
in the event of his death.36 In addition, Kane executed a will that was admitted into 
probate.37 The will named Hecht as executor, and bequeathed “all right, title, and 
interest” in the sperm to Hecht.38 Kane’s will contained a “Statement of Wishes,” which 
conveyed his intent that Hecht use his stored sperm to conceive posthumously.39 Kane’s 
reproductive intent was further demonstrated in a letter addressed to his two adult 
children from a prior marriage, and to his potential posthumous offspring.40 Thereafter, 
Kane committed suicide in a Las Vegas Hotel.41   
                                                
 
33 One example of the negative consequences that follow from a wholesale application of property law to 
sperm, is the difficulty of applying the intestacy scheme to sperm as an indivisible res, where there is more 
than one heir.   
34 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Ct. App. 1993). 
35 Id. at 277. 
36 Id. at 276.    
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 276-77. 
40 Id. at 277. 
41 Id. at 276. 
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 For reasons not revealed in the record, Hecht was not appointed administrator of 
Kane’s estate.42 Instead, Hecht initiated suit to prevent the personal representative of 
Kane’s estate from destroying the sperm stored at Cryobank.43 Kane’s two adult children 
joined the estate’s administrator in opposing Hecht’s request for the 15 vials of sperm.44             
In a case of first impression for United States courts, the California Superior Court was 
called upon to determine the disposition of a decedent’s cryogenically-preserved sperm.45  
 Hecht first asserted claim to the sperm by inter vivos gift, or gift causa mortis.46 
She posited that neither the estate nor Kane’s adult children held any property interest in 
the sperm which would afford them a right to its distribution or destruction. 47 In the 
event that the court classified the sperm as an estate asset, Hecht alternatively argued 
inter alia that she was entitled to the sperm in furtherance of her constitutional privacy 
and procreation rights as sole beneficiary under Kane’s will.48 The estate administrator, 
joined by Kane’s two adult children, responded that Kane did not have a property or 
ownership interest in his sperm once it was removed from his body.49                  
 The court first noted that the legal status of property rights in the human body is 
unsettled.50 It found that the body’s biological materials are objects sui generis, whose 
unique characteristics precluded classifying the sperm categorically, as either property or 
                                                
 
42 See id. at 276 n.1. 
43 Id. at 276. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 279. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 See id. at 280-81 (citing authority under Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990) and 
the California Health and Safety Code).  
50 Id. at 281 (stating that the Moore court’s recognition of a quasi-property right in the human body did not 
“resolve the debate over the existence or extent of a property interest in one’s body”).   
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body part.51 Since sperm is “gametic material” with the potential to create life, it is 
especially unique in comparison to nearly all other human tissue. 52 As a result, the court 
concluded that Kane held a quasi-property interest in his sperm at the time of his death.53 
Although the court stopped shy of declaring that Kane had a complete property right in 
his sperm, the hybrid classification of quasi-property was sufficient to subject the sperm 
to the probate court’s jurisdiction.54 Hence, the law generally applicable to personal 
property was not implicated even though Kane was acknowledged to have held an 
interest in his sperm in the nature of ownership.55 Consequently, Kane was entitled to 
decisional authority over his sperm's posthumous disposition, subject only to applicable 
public policy and health and safety laws.56 The court noted that several outstanding issues 
of material fact prevented it from deciding the ultimate fate of the sperm.57 However, 
before remanding for final determination, the court observed that there was no public 
policy against inseminating an unmarried woman, or against posthumous reproduction 
per se, that would preclude effectuating Kane’s intent.58 
 
 
 
                                                
 
51 Id.  
52 Id. at 283 (citing Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), with approval). 
53 Id. (similarly relying on Davis for authority). It is relevant that this case was brought before the probate 
court. Classifying the sperm as quasi-property enabled the court to invoke its probate jurisdiction, while at 
the same time holding that sperm had unique sui generis attributes.   
54 Id.  
55 Id. at 281. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 289 n.9 (noting that the will’s validity, the decedent’s testamentary capacity, the validity and 
enforceability of the sperm bank contract, and the validity and enforceability of the parties’ two prior 
settlement agreements remained to be determined by the trier of fact, and that these outcomes would 
influence the lower court’s decision regarding the sperm’s ultimate disposition).  
58 See id. at 284-91.   
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2. In re Estate of Kievernagel 
 The Court of Appeals for the Third District of California clarified its adoption of 
the donor intent test in In re Estate of Kievernagel.59 The decedent, Joseph Kievernagel, 
and his wife, Iris Kievernagel, underwent in vitro fertilization (IVF) treatment with the 
Northern California Fertility Medical Center, Inc.60 The Center’s protocol required 
Joseph to provide a frozen sperm sample for back-up purposes and to sign a consent 
agreement specifying disposition of the sperm in the event of death or incapacitation.61  
The form permitted two options: (1) disposal, or (2) donation to spouse.62 Joseph 
initialed, and Iris checked, the box stating that the sperm was to be discarded.63  Joseph 
later died unexpectedly in a helicopter crash.64 When Iris requested her late husband’s 
sperm, the Center refused release absent a court order.65 In opposing the sperm's 
distribution, Joseph’s parents joined as interested parties.66 Iris contended that the 
“unequivocable intent” standard in Hecht was unworkable and difficult to apply.67 She 
lobbied the court to adopt a balancing test in which the surviving spouse’s right to 
procreate would prevail.68 Joseph’s parents countered that distribution of the sperm was 
contrary to Joseph’s express wishes as evidenced in the storage agreement, and further, 
                                                
 
59 In re Estate of Kievernagel, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 311, 316 (Ct. App. 2008). 
60 Id. at 312. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 312-13.   
64 See id. at 312. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 313. 
68 Id. 
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that his intent was corroborated by their personal knowledge that their son did not wish to 
procreate in life.69   
 In resolving the dispute, the court cited Hecht with approval, holding that by 
virtue of its potential to produce life, gametic material constitutes a unique form of 
property that does not implicate general personal property law.70 Since Joseph was the 
sole provider of the gametic material, he alone held an interest likened to ownership, 
which afforded decisional authority over subsequent reproductive use of his sperm.71 
Therefore, to determine the posthumous disposition of Joseph’s frozen sperm, only 
Joseph’s intent was material.72 In addition, the court found that Iris’ constitutional right 
of reproduction was not implicated.73 Since Iris had failed to make a showing that she 
could only become pregnant with Joseph’s sperm, her procreative autonomy was not 
affected to a degree entitling her to the right of decisional authority over the sperm’s 
distribution.74   
III. The Constitutional Rights Balancing Test 
A. The Davis v. Davis Perspective 
 The court in Kievernagel adopted the donor intent test to resolve competing 
claims to the posthumous disposition of sperm. In so doing, the court explicitly rejected 
                                                
 
69 Id. at 312.   
70 Id. at 316. 
71 Id. 
72 See id. (stating that “the trial court properly relied on Joseph’s intent” in determining the posthumous 
disposition of Joseph’s sperm). 
73 Id. at 318. 
74 Id. at 317-18. 
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the decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court in Davis v. Davis,75 an opinion adopting a 
constitutional balancing test rather than according primacy to the intent of the donors.76    
In Davis, the parties disputed the disposition of pre-embryos – the gametic material 
created by the union of sperm and egg that exists once an egg has been fertilized but 
before implantation has occurred.77  In a divorce action, Junior Davis and his wife, Mary 
Sue Davis, disagreed as to who retained custody of the couple’s seven cryogenically 
frozen pre-embryos from a preceding in vitro fertilization treatment.78 Junior sought 
control of the pre-embryos to effect their destruction.79 Although Mary Sue originally 
sought possession of the pre-embryos in order to become pregnant after the dissolution of 
her marriage, by the time the case was heard on appeal, Mary Sue had subsequently 
remarried and no longer wished to use the pre-embryos to impregnate herself.80 Instead, 
Mary Sue sought to donate the pre-embryos to a childless couple.81   
The court decided in favor of Junior, rejecting Mary Sue’s claim to the 
cryopreserved pre-embryos .82 Having first noted that the wishes of the parties could not 
                                                
 
75 Id. at 317. 
76 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 603-04 (Tenn. 1992). Despite indicating a preference to effectuate the 
intent of the donors, the Davis Court was unable to give donor intent dispositive weight.  The disputed 
gametic materials were several pre-embryos.  Because the two donors disagreed over the disposition of the 
pre-embryos, and because there was no statutory law, case law, or prior agreement between them which the 
Court could enforce, the Court instead opted for a constitutional balancing test.       
77 Id. at 589-90. Whereas sperm is a gamete that consists of the genetic contribution of one male donor, a 
pre-embryo represents the union of gametic materials that occurs once a sperm cell fertilizes an egg. See 
Elizabeth A. Trainor, Annotation, Right of Husband, Wife, or Other Party to Custody of Frozen Embryo, 
Pre-embryo, or Pre-zygote in Event of Divorce, Death, or Other Circumstances, 87 A.L.R.5th 253, §2[a] 
(originally published in 2001). 
78 Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589. 
79 Id. at 590. 
80 Id. at 589-90. 
81 Id. at 590. 
82 Id. at 604. 
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simultaneously be given effect,83 and without the benefit of statutory law, case law, or a 
prior enforceable disposition agreement between the parties to direct the case’s 
outcome,84 the court settled on a constitutional balancing test to resolve the dispute 
between the parties and provide for the ultimate disposition of the pre-embryos.85 It 
began by addressing the appropriate legal classification to apply to pre-embryos. The 
Davis court held that pre-embryos occupy an interim category somewhere in the 
continuum between property/tissue and person.86 As a hybrid entity, the court categorized 
the pre-embryos closer to the property end of the spectrum.87 Hence, contract principles 
were deemed applicable to resolve the disposition of the disputed pre-embryos, such that 
the court was willing to recognize as valid and enforceable a former agreement between 
the donating parties that spoke to dispositional outcomes in the event of death or 
divorce.88 Additionally, in the context of constitutional rights balancing, only the interests 
of the respective donors and the merits of their possessory claims would be weighed.89   
To that end, the court began by recognizing two aspects to procreational 
autonomy: the right to procreate and the right not to procreate.90 After conceding that the 
constitutional parameters of procreational autonomy are unclear, the court declared that 
each right was of equal significance.91 In balancing the two, the court considered Junior's 
                                                
 
83 See id. at 601-05 (noting the “equivalence of and inherent tensions between” the interest of producing a 
life via reproduction, and avoiding procreation via abortion). 
84 Id. at 590. 
85 Id. at 604. 
86 Id. at 597. 
87 See id. at 595 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), to the effect that pre-embryos do not enjoy the 
protections of legal personality under federal law).   
88 Id. at 597 (adding the requirement that the initial agreement be subject to subsequent mutual 
modification).   
89 Id. at 604. 
90 Id. at 601. 
91 Id. 
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interest against procreation and forced parentage as against Mary Sue's interest in 
securing the success of the IVF treatment and the continued viability of her genetic 
contribution via donating the pre-embryos to another couple.92 It determined that Junior 
and Mary Sue must be treated as equal gamete providers, despite the argument that the 
IVF process was more invasive to the female participant.93 Despite these differences in 
the invasiveness of the procedure, the court concluded that, generally, the party seeking 
to avoid procreation would prevail.94      
B. The Right to Refrain from Procreation  
 The right to refrain from procreation has been affirmed repeatedly by the United 
States Supreme Court.95 Most applicable are the Court's precedents authorizing the use of 
contraceptives and recognizing a right to pre-viability abortions.96 In Griswold v. 
Connecticut, the Court heard a challenge from a licensed physician, on behalf of himself 
and the married couples to whom he had provided reproductive treatment and counseling.  
The plaintiffs denounced a Connecticut statute prohibiting the dissemination or use of 
contraceptives.97 Speaking for the Court, Justice Douglas overturned the statute as an 
overly broad infringement on the penumbral right of marital privacy guaranteed by the 
Constitution.98 In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court heard a challenge to a Massachusetts 
                                                
 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 604 (noting that this outcome, while far from automatic, was particularly warranted when the party 
pursuing parenthood had alternate means to achieve pregnancy). 
95 See Susan Kerr, Post-Mortem Sperm Procurement: Is it Legal?, 3 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 39, 69 
(1999)  (“From contraception to abortion the Supreme Court has … clearly established a well pronounced 
right not to procreate.”)  (citations omitted) . 
96 JUDITH F. DAAR, REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 104-37 (2006 ed.)  (citing cases covering 
contraceptive use and abortion in support of an affirmative right to reproduce). 
97 381 U.S. 479, 480-81 (1965). 
98 See id at 485.  
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law.99 The law prohibited single persons from obtaining contraceptives in order to 
prevent pregnancy, but permitted married couples to do so through a registered 
physician.100 Holding that the statute impermissibly provided dissimilar treatment for 
married and unmarried couples similarly situated in their desire to avert pregnancy, the 
Court invalidated the statute on equal protection grounds, thereby extending the 
penumbral protections of privacy to unmarried individuals.101  
 In Roe v. Wade, the Court confronted the topic of abortion with a challenge to 
state legislation criminalizing abortion in Texas.102 Justice Blackmun held that the scope 
of the fundamental right to privacy, whether grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment's 
recognition of personal privacy or the Ninth Amendment's declaration of reserved rights 
to the people, was broad enough to include the decision to terminate a pregnancy.103 In 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, this essential holding of Roe v. Wade 
was reaffirmed when the Court held that women have a right to pre-viability abortion 
without undue state interference.104 Through these holdings guaranteeing access to the 
means of preventing and terminating pregnancy, recognition of the right to avoid 
procreation has received strong constitutional sanction and support.105      
 
 
 
 
                                                
 
99 405 U.S. 438, 440 (1972). 
100 Id. at 440-42. 
101 See id. at 454-55. 
102 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973). 
103 Id. at 153. 
104 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992). 
105 Kerr, supra note 95, at 69. 
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C. An Inferred Right to Procreation 
 By contrast, the affirmative right to procreate has not received as much 
constitutional sanction.106 In large part, the paucity of state attempts to limit reproduction 
within the marital relationship has engendered few lawsuits107 to enforce and clarify the 
right to procreation.108 As a result, the parameters of the right remain ill-defined.109           
Despite this dearth of explicit law defining and solidifying an affirmative right to 
procreate, the Supreme Court in dicta, as well as lower courts, have spoken approvingly 
concerning the right to procreate. The strongest Supreme Court support for the right to 
procreate is found in Skinner v. Oklahoma.110 In Skinner, the Court invalidated a 
mandatory sterilization law which applied to three-time larceny convicts but exempted 
embezzlers.111 Although resolved on equal protection grounds, the Court stressed, in 
dicta, the fundamental nature of marriage and procreation.112 Similarly, Justice Brennan, 
writing for the majority in Eisenstadt v. Baird, provided a powerful endorsement for the 
right to procreate when he famously penned that “[i]f the right of privacy means 
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted 
                                                
 
106 Id. at 70 (stating that the right to procreate, while “significant, has never received explicit legal 
recognition”). 
107 One circumstance in which the right to procreate has increasingly been litigated is for prisoners. 
Recognizing that an inmate retains only those rights not “inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with 
the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system,” inquiry is made into whether the right to 
procreate survives incarceration.  See Richard Guidice Jr., Note, Procreation and the Prisoner: Does the 
Right to Procreate Survive Incarceration and Do Legitimate Penological Interests Justify Restrictions on 
the Exercise of the Right, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2277, 2278 (2002). Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617, 
619 (9th. Cir. 2002), is typical of the judicial response to such requests (finding that the right to procreate 
does not survive incarceration).   
108 Kerr, supra note 95, at 71 (citations omitted). 
109 Id. at 70-71.   
110 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
111 Id. at 541 (holding that the distinction is “a clear, pointed, unmistakable discrimination”). 
112 Id.   
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governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision 
whether to bear or beget a child.”113   
 While this impassioned support of the right to privacy was dicta to the Court’s 
holding extending contraceptives to unmarried individuals, the statement does reveal one 
significant point in the Court’s treatment of the right to procreate. To the extent that such 
a right can be recognized, it is a negative right against governmental interference rather 
than a positive right to reproductive services or resources.114 In other words, even if the 
right to procreate is constitutionally protected, it may not extend to procreation by 
assisted methods.115  
D. Rights of the Decedent 
 In the aftermath of its adoption in the United States, the common law precept that 
causes of action are personal and abated with the death of the individual116 has been 
discredited in favor of recognizing tort claims for wrongful death and survival.117 Despite 
this change in substantive law, it is nonetheless true that these causes of action accrue to 
the surviving next of kin of the deceased, and not to the decedent himself.118 In terms of 
relevant law that applies to dead bodies, it can more accurately be stated, as did the court 
in Whitehurst v. Wright, that “[a]fter death, one is no longer a person within our 
                                                
 
113 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
114 Kerr, supra note 95, at 70 (citations omitted).   
115 See DAAR, supra note 96, at 137 (noting that the Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether 
procreation using assisted reproductive technologies is constitutionally protected); cf. Webster v. Reprod. 
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 509-11 (1989) (holding, in the analogous context of abortion, that the State 
has no affirmative duty to use public facilities and staff in furtherance of a nontherapeutic abortion).    
116 The first statement of the common law rule, action personalis moritur cum persona, was found in Lord 
Ellenborough’s opinion in Baker v. Bolton.  STUART M. SPEISER & JAMES E. ROOKS, JR., RECOVERY FOR 
WRONGFUL DEATH § 1:2 (4th ed.)  (citations omitted).   
117 See id. §§ 1:6-1:7; 1 AM. JUR. 2D Abatement, Survival, and Revival §53 (2012).   
118 25A C.J.S. Death § 51 (2012). 
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constitutional and statutory framework, and has no rights of which he may be 
deprived.”119       
 In Whitehurst, the decedent was fatally shot by a police officer who mistakenly 
believed him to be a robbery suspect.120 The officer claimed the shot was fired for self-
defense, in response to an initial shot from Whitehurst.121 Although no weapon was 
initially discovered on or in the vicinity of the deceased, a detective arriving on the scene 
later discovered a weapon 27 inches from the dead body.122 When it was determined that 
the gun was a planted police weapon previously confiscated by police in a drug raid over 
one year prior, the decedent’s mother brought suit, alleging that the shooting and 
subsequent cover-up violated her son’s civil rights.123 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit affirmed the trial court’s holding that a constitutional rights claim cannot be 
maintained for alleged violations to a decedent.124 Since the alleged predicate events of 
the cover-up occurred after Mr. Whitehurst’s death, and because no claim was advanced 
that the police conspired to kill the decedent and conceal their misdeed before the fatal 
encounter, the court concluded that a claim for civil rights violations could not be 
entertained on the facts.125  
 By contrast to the constitutional rights and protections of individuals which 
terminate upon death,126 the spouse and family members of the decedent have a 
recognized quasi-property right in the decedent’s remains that manifests at the death of 
                                                
 
119 592 F.2d 834, 840 (5th Cir. 1979). 
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the individual as a right of possession, preservation, and burial.127 Although not an 
absolute right,128 this quasi-property interest typically entitles the next-of-kin to dispose 
of their family member’s remains.129 Under appropriate circumstances, the next-of-kin 
are also authorized to permit organ donation, so long as the decedent had not expressed 
an intent to the contrary while alive.130               
 Significantly, public policy can also circumscribe or wholly prohibit effectuating 
a decedent’s intent with regard to the disposition of decedent’s remains. For example, 
autopsies may be performed without considering the wishes of the decedent or next-of-
kin when evidence exists that the decedent died under suspicious or violent 
circumstances.131 In addition, burial is another area in which the intent of the decedent 
may be subject to posthumous limitation.132 Thus, the state is at liberty to impose 
municipal regulations restricting the right of burial, as dictated by health, sanitation, and 
other public policy considerations.133      
IV. Analysis 
 Where it is known how the decedent prefers to posthumously dispose of his 
sperm, the decedent’s intent should control. This outcome is in accordance with the 
general legal philosophy that undergirds wills and trusts law, in which the decedent may 
                                                
 
127 See Kerr, supra note 95, at 59 (citation omitted).  
128 Deference is due to the wishes of the decedent.  Id. at 48-49.  In addition, the State, acting under its 
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dictate.  Id. at 49-51.  
129 25A C.J.S. Dead Bodies § 15 (2012).  
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direct the disposition of his property after his death.134 It is further supported by the logic 
of the court in Davis. In the context of pre-embryos, which consist of the physical union 
of male and female gametic materials, the court decided to resolve the disposition dispute 
by balancing the rights of the two interest holders. By analogy, where the gametic 
material at issue belongs only to one individual, as is the case with sperm or ova, the 
manifested intent of the sole donor should be given dispositive weight. Hence, the court 
in In re Estate of Kievernagel held that the decedent's plain intent to have his sperm 
sample destroyed upon his death defeated his widow's request to conceive using his 
sperm.135              
 As the court in Hecht was careful to note, the outcome in which primacy is 
accorded to the known intent of the decedent is best accomplished by recognizing that the 
decedent has a quasi-property interest in the nature of ownership in his sperm, such that 
he may control the posthumous disposition of his gametes.136 This middle-ground 
approach avoids the pitfalls of outright classification at the extremes of either property or 
person.137 If a wholesale property designation is adopted, complications will arise in the 
implementation of intestacy schemes. Multiple legal claims to an indivisible res, 
particularly where the intestate takers do not share a common dispositional desire, will 
result in heated and protracted legal disputes. These problems will be further 
                                                
 
134 95 C.J.S. Wills § 182 (2012) (noting that a "testator of sound mind has … absolute dominion over the 
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135 In re Estate of Kievernagel, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 311, 316-17 (Ct. App. 2008). 
136 Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 281 (Ct. App. 1993). 
137 Katheleen R. Guzman, Property, Progeny, Body Part: Assisted Reproduction and the Transfer of 
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compounded by the operation of representation.138 Meanwhile, from a public policy 
perspective, the greater the degree of attenuation between the decedent and the heir who 
ultimately receives the gametic matter, the more uncomfortable it may become to accept 
the operation of default rules to direct the ultimate disposition of this highly personal 
material.139   
 Conversely, classifying the gametic material as a person would be at odds with 
Supreme Court precedent, to wit, the holding in Roe v. Wade that a fetus is not a 
person.140 This classification would result in several significant consequences. First, the 
ambit of criminal liability could drastically expand to include reckless abandonment, 
involuntary manslaughter, reckless endangerment, and a host of other potential criminal 
charges for conduct of the soon to be mother that occurs before the birth of her child. As 
an example, drinking alcohol, or exposing the fetus to second hand smoke may carry 
criminal consequences. Second, this increased criminal liability would enhance the 
trauma of unpreventable miscarriages or stillbirths.  A woman newly grieving the loss of 
her fetus' viability would be further tormented by the possibility or even the reality of a 
criminal prosecution. Third, promising work in the area of embryonic stem-cell research, 
and the field of artificial reproductive technology would be dealt a deathblow.  While 
programs such as embryonic stem-cell research have previously operated in the face of 
                                                
 
138 Even where the number of legally recognized heirs is not thereby increased, the potential for 
intergenerational conflict may be compounded.   
139 The concepts of laughing heirs and escheat to the state might be difficult to reconcile with the highly 
personal nature of gametic materials.   
140 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973). 
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limitations on the use of federal funding,141 the attachment of criminal liability to these 
scientific endeavors would likely prove fatal to the program's continued existence.142 
 Once the classification of sperm is accomplished, questions surrounding the 
adequacy of proof – the resort to intrinsic or extrinsic evidence, the necessity vel non of a 
writing, and the degree of authenticating requirements of form necessary – are best left to 
the individual states to decide as public policy dictates. Flexible standards of proof may 
be established in conjunction with rebuttable presumptions that operate to give legal 
recognition and enforcement to an adequate demonstration of the decedent’s intent, 
without the constraints a rigid adherence to the dictates of formalism would require.  
 One such method would involve giving effect to a decedent's reasonably inferred 
intent.143 In the contexts both of organ donation, where the decedent has not previously 
signed donor cards, or discussed his preference with a physician,144 and provision of life 
support for patients without an advance directive,145 it is clear that other areas of the law 
already recognize that making decisions based on a patient's reasonably inferred wishes is 
consistent with a respect for patient autonomy.146                     
 By extension, where the decedent’s dispositional intent is unknown, the 
constitutional balancing test could support substituting a surviving individual’s intent for 
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the intent of the decedent, in limited situations. The constitutional right to reproduce, 
though not given explicit authorization in Supreme Court holdings, is nonetheless 
discussed with a high degree of approbation in dicta.147 At least two commentators have 
argued that this dicta is highly suggestive that if the Court were to be confronted with a 
case that directly restricted the rights of married couples to reproduce, it would assert an 
affirmative right to procreation.148 Lower courts have similarly confirmed the existence 
of an affirmative right to procreate.149 Some, including the Davis court, have held that 
“whatever its ultimate constitutional boundaries, the right of procreational autonomy is 
composed of two rights of equal significance—the right to procreate and the right to 
avoid procreation.”150   
In view of the circumscribed rights decedents currently possess in the disposition 
of his own remains, rights which may be limited by the surviving spouse or next-of-kin 
exercising their “right of burial,” or by municipal restrictions, public policy, and health 
and sanitation considerations, it may be tempting to conclude that the constitutional 
balancing test will similarly prevail over the decedent's contrary intent, and favor 
effectuating the surviving sperm claimant's wishes, to the detriment of the decedent's 
desires.151 However, while the constitutional balancing test may counsel that the intent of 
the survivor predominates, such an outcome is not advisable in all circumstances. 
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Requests for the use of a particular decedent’s sperm are potentially varied and many.152 
It would appear ill-advised to approach this vast tangle of interpersonal relationships with 
a rigidly enforced and unyielding pre-determined outcome. This is particularly true given 
the myriad legal consequences of posthumous reproduction on the decedent’s estate. 
These include: alterations to the class size of decedent's descendants, entitlement to 
benefits ranging from social security to workers’ compensation and tort recoveries, and 
standing to bring wrongful death or survivor claims, among others. Each of these 
contingencies can potentially yield numerous controversial and contested legal issues.    
 Given this breath of legal implications, uniformity in the law is desirable. Among 
the advantages of uniformity, enhanced predictability of legal outcome and increased 
legitimacy for the legal system are of primary importance. With predictability, the public 
can anticipate a likely outcome and modify its behavior as needed, assured in the belief 
that regional variations will not prevail. In turn, increased predictability fosters 
legitimacy, to the extent that legal outcomes are seen as grounded in the law and applied 
systematically to all, rather than as justice dispensed at the whim of an arbitrary judiciary.  
 In the interest of generating a bright line rule to address the problems discussed 
above, the following approach is offered: where decedent’s intent is not formally 
documented or reasonably inferred, his spouse may, in certain circumstances, authorize 
posthumous extraction.153 This neither implies that marriage is an appropriate proxy for a 
decedent's intent to procreate, nor that marriage in all circumstances is undertaken with 
the intent of the parties to reproduce. Nonetheless, it remains true that marriage, which 
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often lends legal sanction to procreative attempts, arguably represents one step closer on 
the continuum towards a couple exercising its reproductive choice. Setting a requirement 
of marriage would support the public policy objective of limiting the number of legally 
valid claims, such that strangers would be prevented from making demands on a 
particular decedent's sperm, in the quest for a cash or celebrity baby.  Further, 
establishing this rule as a rebuttable presumption would appropriately place the burden of 
proof on the challenging party, such that the decedent's intent could be increasingly 
effectuated in circumstances where his intent was not documented in a writing, but was 
nonetheless known to his next-of-kin. At best, this rule would enable decedent's intent to 
be honored more frequently; at worst, it would err on the side of respecting the 
procreative right and reproductive preference of the surviving spouse.   
 Admittedly, one regrettable outcome of the marital limitation would be the impact 
on couples whose relationships do not have the sanction of legal recognition. However, to 
the extent that the wishes of these individuals could be carried out with an appropriate 
manifestation of intent, tailored to the requirements of their jurisdiction, such negative 
consequences can be mitigated.  
V. Conclusion 
 Posthumous sperm extraction is a practice that occurs largely in the absence of 
governing statutory law.  Given this lack of legal guidance, the decision to grant a request 
for post-mortem sperm removal is frequently conducted by hospital staff in an ad-hoc 
fashion, and on the basis of primarily ethical rather than legal considerations.  To curb 
this legal uncertainty, the following approach is advocated: In the first instance, the 
decedent has a recognized quasi-property interest in his gametic material.  His 
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dispositional intent should govern where it is documented in writing, or reasonably 
inferred.  In the alternative, the request of a surviving spouse may be honored in certain 
situations, as a matter of respect for the spouse's constitutional right to procreate.  Such 
an approach effectuates the intent of the decedent, where this intent can be discerned, 
without overly compromising the reproductive rights of the surviving spouse.        
